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THE ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES OF JURORS'
TREATMENT OF CORPORATE DEFENDANTS
Valerie P. Hans*
This Article contrasts the illusions and realities of jurors' treatment
of corporate defendants in civil litigation. Business leaders have
voiced the opinion that they are often victimized by civil juries, who
rule against them more on the basis of deep-seated hostility to busi-
ness than on the grounds of actual negligence.1 Claims that the jury
engages in undeservedly negative treatment of the business corpora-
tion have been central to heated debate over the role of the jury and
its place in an alleged litigation crisis, which in turn has fueled tort
reform efforts across the nation.2 To counteract the supposed nega-
tive consequences of jury misbehavior on the economy, many state
legislatures have passed bills that place new limits on the role of the
civil jury and caps on pain and suffering and punitive damages. 3 Tort
reform bills aimed at reducing the federal civil jury's role have been
regularly submitted to Congress, but have been less successful to date.
At both the state and federal levels, the business community has been
a forceful advocate of tort reform efforts to limit the civil jury's role. 4
In this Article, I argue that the simplistic illusion of the anti-busi-
ness jury fails to accord with a much more complex reality. Reflecting
the citizenry from which they are drawn, civil jurors are largely sup-
* Professor of Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice and Director of the Legal Stud-
ies Program, University of Delaware. Most of the research described in this article was sup-
ported by National Science Foundation grants SES-8822598 and GER-9350498 as well as a
fellowship during 1996-1997 in the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Delaware. In
addition, the research on Arizona jury reform described in the Article was funded by State
Justice Institute grant SJI-96-12A-B-181 to the National Center for State Courts. The points of
view expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or
policies of the State Justice Institute or the National Center for State Courts.
1. See infra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
2. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 1-27
(1995); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207, 248-51 (1990); Richard B. Schmitt, While Congress De-
bates, States Limit Civil Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1995, at B1.
3. A summary of some recent state tort reform measures may be found in Darryl Van Duch,
Illinois Tort Reform: A Cautionary Tale, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 9, 1986, at Al, A21.
4. Richard B. Schmitt, GOP Drive to Curb Liability Suits Emboldens the Business Lobbyists,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1995, at B2; Richard B. Schmitt, Powerful Companies Unite to Push for
Legal Reform, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1994.
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portive of the aims of American business and extremely concerned
about the potential negative effects on business corporations of exces-
sive litigation.5 At the same time, they hold corporate defendants to
more exacting standards compared to individual litigants, and expect
businesses to exhibit a high degree of care for workers and consum-
ers.6 The application of this distinctive standard appears to be consis-
tent with the political function of the American jury.
THE ILLUSIONS
Do citizens enter the jury box consumed with hostility toward the
corporate defendant? In his historical account of the civil jury, Pro-
fessor Stephan Landsman suggests that the tendency to see the jury as
anti-business dates to the very beginnings of the Republic.7 He ob-
serves that the founders of the country were predominantly small
business owners and creditors who waxed eloquent about the benefits
of the criminal jury, but were far less enamored of the civil jury.8 As
Landsman describes the prevailing view at the time of the drafting of
the Constitution:
[J]ury decisions were bound to be ad hoc and, quite frequently, anti-
creditor. If America's financial system was to be rendered sound, it
was arguably necessary to curtail jury action in favor of more pre-
dictable and consistent rulings protecting investors.9
Indeed, the right to a jury in civil cases was not enshrined in the text
of the original Constitution but left to the Seventh Amendment.10 As
the judiciary became increasingly professionalized, and the needs of
business in an expanding economy more pressing, there were new
pressures to limit the jury's role." During the nineteenth century,
special rules of liability including the assumption of risk doctrine, fel-
low servant rule, and contributory negligence were developed to keep
cases of industrial injury from the supposedly partial jury.' 2
Contemporary assessments of the jury's predispositions toward
business corporations in the courtroom continue to reflect the view
that juries are anti-business. Lawyer George McGunnigle, Jr. argues
5. See infra notes 32-35, 42-45 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 36-41, 59-71 and accompanying text.
7. Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT: As-
SESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 44 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
8. Id. at 37.
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
11. Landsman, supra note 7, at 43-44.
12. Id. See the historical account by LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 470-73 (2d ed. 1985).
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that jurors' naive and unrealistic expectations of business people, their
lack of experience and understanding about corporate affairs, and the
American tradition of sympathizing with the underdog all place the
corporate defendant at a disadvantage in the courtroom.' 3 Many
members of the business community share this belief that jurors are
predisposed against business corporations and that this stance disad-
vantages them in the courtroom.' 4 The supposedly negative predispo-
sition of the jury is thought to stem from natural sympathies toward
injured plaintiffs who sue corporations as well as other prejudices
against business corporations.' 5
A common belief is that jurors are so prone to favor individual
plaintiffs over corporate defendants that they pick the "deep pockets"
of rich business corporations and deliver extremely high awards that
are not merited by the company's actions or the plaintiff's injuries. In
one national survey, senior corporate executives provided their assess-
ments about the reasons that litigation and civil justice costs were
high.' 6 The top reason given was "the knowledge that major corpo-
rate defendants and their insurance companies have deep pockets.' 7
"Juries that hand out excessively high awards" came in third as a rea-
son for high costs.' 8
Professor John Lande interviewed business executives and attor-
neys who did a substantial amount of business litigation, questioning
them about their opinions of the court system.' 9 His interviews reveal
that most business executives hold negative views of the courts in gen-
eral and the civil jury in particular. 20 Most executives with whom he
spoke think juries are to be avoided in cases that call for assessing the
13. George McGunnigle, Representing the Corporate Defendant in the Courtroom: Reflections
of a Veteran Advocate, in ViEws FROM THE COURTROOM 1, .3-4 (Brookings Institution/ABA
Section of Litigation 1993).
14. See infra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
16. Michele Galen et al., Guilty! Too Many Lawyers and Too Much Litigation. Here's a Better
Way., Bus. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 60, 64; The Verdict From the Corner Office, Bus. WK., Apr. 13,
1992, at 66 (surveying 400 senior executives regarding court costs, court reform, and other im-
pacts of litigation on business) (Business Week/Harris Executive Poll).
17. The Verdict From the Corner Office, supra note 16, at 66.
18. Id.
19. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives'
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 51 (1998). Professor Lande conducted telephone
interviews with 50 business executives, 58 inside corporate counsel, and 70 outside counsel, and a
small number of face-to-face interviews with members of each group. Id. at 10. Executives
interviewed on the telephone included only very senior executives in the corporate hierarchy.
Id. at 51.
20. Id. at 32-35.
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liability of business corporations. 21 They are concerned about both
competence and bias.22 In the words of one executive:
Is it any surprise that many commercial contracts these days have a
clause where each party waives its right to a jury trial? Doesn't that
tell you something? That they are not willing to trust twelve peers
off the street with the complexity of their business transaction. 23
The attorneys were somewhat more positive than the executives about
jury trials in business cases, but still expressed worry over bias and
prejudice. 24 As the general counsel for one corporation argued:
Oh, a plaintiff's lawyer can get [jurors] all riled up on emotion. It's
got nothing to do with the law. It's got nothing to do with real lia-
bility. It's got nothing to do with real facts. It's got to do with who's
the better actor.25
Another observed:
I think jurors are sometimes willing to do justice ... because they
just view this rule .. .as one that kind of comes up with a harsh
result in this case. And those are the cases that maybe will go to a
jury more often than not because a plaintiff's lawyer knows that and
[thinks], "God, if I get by this motion for summary judgment and
get to a jury, I've got a real chance because that argument about,
'Well, the law says X' is just not going to be real persuasive to most
folks on the jury."'26
This brief description of the views of jurors' supposed tendencies in
trials with business and corporate parties shows a remarkable degree
of consistency. For a variety of reasons, whether it is sympathy for
injured individuals, hostility to business institutions, or desires to
transfer wealth from the deep pockets of business corporations, the
civil jury is seen as anti-business.
THE REALITIES
Let us set aside for the moment the specific charge that juries de-
liver unequal justice to business corporations. Commentators who
have examined the broader question of how business fares in the civil
justice system conclude that, on the whole, business corporations ap-
pear to enjoy more favorable experiences in court compared to other
litigants. 27 First, of course, it is appropriate to mention that one of the
21. Id. at 34.
22. Id. at 34-35.
23. Id. at 34.
24. Id. at 29-35.
25. Lande, supra note 19, at 34.
26. Id. at 35.
27. Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S.
Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 497, 515-17, 557-58 (1996) (reporting research
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major advantages of the corporate legal form is its limited liability. In
addition, historians maintain that beginning in the nineteenth century,
societal desires to stimulate the economy led to generous treatment of
business corporations in the developing tort system.28 In his classic
piece, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead, Professor Marc Galanter
elaborated the many advantages that "repeat players" such as busi-
ness corporations hold in civil litigation.29 Compared to those who
litigate only occasionally, repeat players are more likely to be able to
structure legal transactions, engage in litigation with a long-term strat-
egy in mind, have the ability to play for the rules, have bargaining
credibility, possess specialized expertise, and benefit from economies
of scale. 30
POTENTIAL REASONS WHY JURIES MIGHT TREAT CORPORATE
PARTIES DIFFERENTLY
The broad context of business litigation suggests that the business
community often fares quite well. However, let us now narrow the
focus to considering jury trials involving business parties. What are
the theoretical reasons why juries might treat corporate parties more
harshly, or at least differently? Here I wish to draw on both popular
perceptions of jury bias and theoretical work in psychology. Both
sources provide some potential explanations for differential
treatment.
1. Attitudes Toward Business
One set of arguments revolves around the role of anti-business prej-
udice. From a theoretical perspective, just as attitudes influence deci-
sion-making about individual litigants, favorability or negativity
toward business might influence legal decision-making about a busi-
ness corporation's behavior. Psychological research on the role of at-
titudes in jury decision making has confirmed that pre-existing
attitudes toward the parties or issues in a case can have some impact
on how evidence is viewed and integrated into a trial story, and how
data showing the litigation successes of large business in federal courts); see RALPH NADER &
WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PRESERVATION OF JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (1996).
28. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 300-01; MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORmA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 80-85 (1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 20-21 (1956).
29. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 98-125 (1974).
30. Id. at 125 fig.3 and accompanying text.
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the credibility of witnesses is assessed.31 Usually, the effects of atti-
tudes on liability or guilt judgments are rather modest.
Given the widespread belief in the anti-business jury, it is interest-
ing to observe that surveys of attitudes toward business show that the
public is on the whole quite favorable to many aspects of business.
For example, the public strongly endorses the free enterprise system,
seeing it as a necessary precondition for free and democratic govern-
ment.32 Americans express support for cultural values underlying a
capitalist economy, such as the Protestant work ethic, personal ambi-
tion, and competition. 33 They also evaluate the functioning of busi-
ness corporations in a positive way. For example, in a Business Week/
Louis Harris national survey, six out of ten respondents rated the
overall performance of American corporations as "pretty good" or
"excellent. ' 34 In other national surveys, people express more confi-
dence in the people running major companies than in the executive
branch of government, Congress, organized religion, and the press.35
However, some negative perceptions of business co-exist with these
largely positive views. The public seems to be particularly concerned
about the possibility that business leaders could misuse their substan-
tial power. A 1998 national survey36 of the public co-sponsored by the
National Law Journal and the jury consulting firm DecisionQuest
found that about three-fourths of the respondents agreed that
"[e]xecutives of big companies often try to cover up the harm they
do."'37 Similarly, seven of ten respondents in the Business Week/Louis
Harris poll agreed that business had gained too much power in the
United States.38 Significant minorities also thought that business
would put workers' health and safety at risk, endanger public health,
and harm the environment to turn a profit.39 Perhaps because of
31. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE JUROR 42,
42-46 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
32. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LA-
BOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND 255 (rev. ed. 1987); HERBERT MCCLOSKY & JO1N
ZALLER, THE AMERICAN ETHOS: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY
101-03 (1984); BENJAMIN PAGE & DAVID SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 117-71 (1992).
33. MCCLOSKY & ZALLER, supra note 32, at 101-28.
34. The Public is Willing to Take Business On, Bus. WK., May 29, 1989, at 29 (surveying
American people regarding business performance and ethics).
35. RICHARD NIEMI ET AL., TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION: A COMPENDIUM OF SURVEY DATA
93-105 (1989).
36. Peter Aronson et al., Jurors: A Biased, Independent Lot, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, at Al,
A24-A25.
37. Id. at Al; see <http://www.nlj.com/1998/decisionquest-survey/qOl12a.html>.
38. The Public is Willing to Take Business On, supra note 34, at 29.
39. Id.
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these concerns, there is substantial public support for governmental
regulation of business enterprises.40 After reviewing recent public
opinion surveys of Americans concerning the regulation of business,
Benjamin Page and David Shapiro concluded that "[a]t the beginning
of the 1990s it was clear that the overwhelming majority of Americans
was committed to government protection of consumers and the
environment."'4 1
Although believing that such legal and governmental control over
business is important, the public also recognizes its down side. The
National Law Journal/DecisionQuest poll, for instance, uncovered
widespread views that lawsuits have driven up the cost of insurance,
medical care, and products.42 Many participants in my research stud-
ies agree that "[t]he threat of lawsuits is so prevalent today that it
interferes with the development of new and useful products; ' 43 that
"[t]he courts have meddled so much in the workplace that many busi-
nesses are not able to remain competitive; 44 and that "[t]he govern-
ment has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with -the
free enterprise system. '4 5
2. Empathy for Injured Individuals
Integrally related to the claim that jurors are anti-business is the
argument that in any contest between a corporation and an injured
individual, the individual has a decided advantage. In this perspective,
observers' sympathies "naturally, honestly and generously"4 6 gravitate
to the individual who is injured, especially when that individual sues a
body-less, soul-less corporation. It is certainly a possibility that an in-
dividual observer may be better able to empathize with another indi-
vidual than with a corporation. Indeed, trial tactics guides seem to
intuit this possibility when they recommend to those representing
businesses to humanize the corporation by emphasizing the people
who work there and those who are helped by its products.47
40. UPSET & SCHNEIDER, supra note 32, at 255; MCCLOSKY & ZALLER, supra note 32, at 120;
PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 32, at 157-59.
41. PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 32, at 159.
42. Aronson et al., supra note 36, at A24; see <http://www.nlj.com/1998/decisionquest-survey/
q09-38.html>.
43. Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & Soc'y REV. 85, 99 (1992).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Landsman, supra note 7, at 45 (citing Haring v. New York & Erie R.R., 13 Barb. 2, 15
(N.Y. 1853)).
47. McGunnigle, supra note 13, at 5-6; Videotape: Handling Sympathy in Jury Trials (Federa-
tion of Insurance and Corporate Counsel) (on file with author).
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Finis E. Cowan, from Baker & Botts in Houston, was co-lead coun-
sel in American Airlines, Inc.'s successful defense of an antitrust law-
suit brought by other airlines for allegedly anti-competitive practices.
He discussed how he attempted to develop a positive "human" face
for his corporate client during the jury trial.48 Because he believes
that jurors approach a business case with prejudices against corporate
executives, "you've got to get the jury to think that your executives
are pretty nice folks."'49 One challenge to that strategy was a top
American Airlines executive who had the reputation for saying about
competitors: "Kill 'em. Crush 'em. Grind 'em up."50 Cowan fore-
warned the jury in his opening statement that the executive could be
crusty at times, and then during the executive's testimony, "I tried to
make him relax. My approach was folksy and conversational .... I
asked him how he met his wife. How long he was married. How he
came up in business. ' 51 The executive's enthusiasm for American
Airlines and its programs came through, and the jury delivered a com-
plete defense verdict in thirty minutes, saying that the executive's tes-
timony "turned the tide."'52
The belief that an injured individual has an inherent advantage over
the faceless corporation is strong. Yet, survey evidence, interviews
with jurors, and psychological research all place some qualifications
on the idea that jurors respond sympathetically to injured plaintiffs.5 3
National surveys since the 1980s regularly find that the vast majority
of the public believes that there is a great deal of frivolous litigation
and that many plaintiffs bring unjustified lawsuits. 54 In my own re-
search with jurors who decided cases with business parties, I often
found jurors highly critical of plaintiffs who brought lawsuits against
business corporations, even in cases where they ultimately concluded
that negligence existed and an award was justified.5 5 Psychological
research on the need to believe in a just world has documented many
instances in which people derogate, rather than sympathize with, in-
48. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Make Sure the Jury Sees Corporation Witnesses as Fellow Human
Beings, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 14, 1994, at S6.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
54. Aronson et al., supra note 36 (National Law Journal Poll); H. Taylor et al., Public Atti-
tudes Toward the Civil Justice System and Tort Law Reform (Survey conducted for Aetna Life
& Casualty by Louis Harris & Associates) (Copy on file with Louis Harris & Associates, 630
Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 101111); To Sue or Not to Sue: Public Backs Liability Reform, PuB.
PULSE, Aug. 1991, at 6.
55. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 43, at 94-100.
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jured victims. 56 Finally, new experimental research shows that plain-
tiffs are significantly disadvantaged when juries assess comparative
fault.57 In a recent study, mock jurors attributed some blame to plain-
tiffs who were legally blameless, and judgments of blameworthiness
affected the award amount. 58
3. The "Reasonable Corporation" Standard
Quite independent of whether jurors like or dislike business, they
may hold distinct expectations of a commercial business enterprise
that they do not have for individuals or other types of groups. Indeed,
the law includes many special rules of liability for commercial enter-
prises.59 Professor Robert MacCoun argues that commercial activities
"may invoke specific norms and expectations that are distinct from
the norms and expectations that govern other social contexts" and
points out that commercial activities expose large numbers of people
to the consequences of those activities.60 Professor V. Lee Hamilton
and her colleagues have found that persons in positions of authority
are held to higher levels of responsibility compared to subordinates. 61
Similarly, Professor Neil Vidmar discovered that lay participants in-
voke the special role and higher responsibility of doctors in deciding
medical malpractice cases. 62
In the same way that people expect more of the boss and the doc-
tor, citizens may expect more of corporations. In making decisions
about the culpability of an organization, people may respond to struc-
tural differences between individuals and corporations. The typical
corporation is organized in a rational structure and contains a number
of individuals with specialized skills. Because of these characteristics,
56. MELVIN LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION 39-41
(1990); KELLY SHAVER, THE A'TTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
BLAMEWORTHINESS 133, 134 (1985).
57. Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of
Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
597, 610-12 (1997).
58. Id. at 610.
59. See, for example, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed.
1984) or any treatise on business law!
60. Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Exami-
nation of the "Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 L. & Soc'Y REV. 121, 135 (1996).
61. V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 75-88 (1992); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE
HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RE-
SPONSIBILITY 195-210, 261-77 (1989).
62. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 3-
22 (1995).
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groups such as corporations may be assumed to possess greater ration-
ality and more ability to anticipate the consequences of their actions
than individuals. 63 In one study, Clark McCauley and Susan Jacques
sought to determine why conspiracy theories of presidential assassina-
tion were so popular among members of the public.64 In a series of
studies, they found that groups are viewed as more effective than indi-
viduals, and thus are seen as more capable of assassinating a
president.65
Adding to the group factor is the presence of expertise among the
members of the corporation. Both of these features are likely to in-
crease the perceived likelihood (if not the actual likelihood) of fore-
seeability of the consequences of corporate action, both negative and
positive. If corporations are better able to foresee any negative effects
of their behavior, then they should be judged more harshly if such
negative effects occur. Intentionality is an important principle gov-
erning the attribution of responsibility. 66 In addition, both the crimi-
nal and the civil justice systems levy more punitive sanctions for
intentional harmdoing.67
A corporation's potential reach and impact, its collective expertise,
or its profit-making nature could all influence expectations which in
turn affect judgments in the courtroom. I want to underscore the
point that these hypothesized greater expectations are theoretically
distinct from pro-business or anti-business attitudes. Even if individu-
als have high confidence in business and believe business is a worth-
while endeavor, they might still feel that the singular role of the
business enterprise requires it to follow special rules and standards of
behavior that do not apply to individuals.
On the other hand, those involved in the development of criminal
codes for corporate misbehavior note that it is often difficult to deter-
mine responsibility for outcomes of group activity.68 Sociologists Matt
Lee and M. David Ermann have written about the problems inherent
63. Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward Corporate Responsibility: A Psycholegal Perspective, 69
NEB. L. REV. 158, 170-83 (1990).
64. Clark McCauley & Susan Jacques, The Popularity of Conspiracy Theories of Presidential
Assassination: A Bayesian Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 637, 638 (1979).
65. Id.
66. SHAVER, supra note 56, at 88-90, 102-09.
67. R. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (4th ed. 1986).
68. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 1-38 (1984); CHRISTO-
PHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 1-8,
74-111 (1975); William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Busi-
ness Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 L. & Soc'v REV. 741, 748-56 (1993).
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in applying individual analogies to corporate behavior. 69 They write
that the commonly received wisdom about the Ford Pinto injuries as
the result of profit maximization is flawed because it overemphasizes
the psychological characteristics of decision makers and downplays or-
ganizational, industrial, legal, and regulatory influences. 70 In addition,
the well-known phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility among
members of a group 7' could complicate the judgment of responsibility
for the corporate entity as a whole.
4. The Deep Pockets Approach
Yet another rationale for differential treatment is frequently ad-
vanced in critiques of the civil jury. A "deep pockets" approach might
lead people to take the finances of the organization into account in
determining damages and perhaps even liability. Lawyers consider it
a truism that juries penalize corporations for their financial resources,
using them as deep pockets from which to compensate undeserving
plaintiffs, and the executive survey cited earlier showed widespread
agreement that excessive jury awards were a serious problem for the
business community.72 A 1993 National Law Journal poll of 800 peo-
ple who had served on civil or criminal juries found that about one-
third of the civil jurors reported that others on their jury had consid-
ered the financial situation of defendants in the process of arriving at
a damage award in civil lawsuits.73
Stating the deep pockets hypothesis more broadly, jurors might be
motivated to consider the financial equities of their award, and how a
plaintiff award would affect both parties. What might appear to be a
corporate deep pockets effect could actually be an individual empty
pockets effect, as jurors undercompensate plaintiffs who sue other in-
dividuals because they are concerned about the consequences to the
individual defendant. If so, awards of plaintiffs who sue business cor-
porations might actually be closer to an appropriate level of
compensation.
69. Matthew T. Lee & M. David Ermann, 1 Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narra-
tive: An Organizational and Network Analysis, 46 Soc. PROBS. (forthcoming Feb. 1999).
70. Id.
71. John M. Darley & Bibb Latane, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Re-
sponsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 377-78 (1968); see KELMAN & HAMILTON,
supra note 61, at 165, 334.
72. The Verdict from the Corner Office, supra note 16.
73. The View from the Jury Box, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S15.
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THE REALITIES OF JURY DECISION MAKING
There are a number of reasons to expect that juries might treat cor-
porations differently. Some of those reasons, like anti-business preju-
dice, greater empathy toward injured individuals, or deep pockets,
suggest that juries take arguably impermissible factors into account in
deciding cases with corporate parties. Others, such as the reasonable
corporation standard, suggest that even if juries treat corporate de-
fendants differently, they could be exercising a completely appropri-
ate fact-finding, equity, or political function.
I would now like to turn to the research evidence that I and other
scholars have collected about how juries respond to business corpora-
tions as parties in civil litigation. The questions addressed by the re-
search include: (1) whether or not juries appear to treat business
corporations differently; and (2) if juries do treat them differently,
why they do so.
ANALYSES OF JURY VERDICTS AND AWARDS
Statistical analyses provide some initial evidence that jury verdicts
and awards differ in cases with corporate defendants as compared to
individual defendants. In one of the earliest studies pertaining to this
issue, Audrey Chin and Mark Peterson analyzed civil jury verdicts in
Cook County, Illinois, during the 1960s and 1970s, and determined
that corporate defendants were more likely to be found liable and had
to pay larger awards than corporate and governmental defendants. 74
Similarly, National Center for State Courts researchers Brian Os-
trom, David Rottman, and Roger Hanson analyzed tort cases and
awards that were decided during 1989 in twenty-seven state courts of
general jurisdiction. 75 They found that the individual or corporate
identity of the parties was a highly significant factor in plaintiff success
rate and awards.76 Corporate and other institutional defendants were
more likely than individual defendants to prevail at the verdict stage. 77
Individual plaintiffs suing corporations won 50% of their cases, com-
pared to a 61% success rate when individuals sued other individuals. 78
However, when corporate defendants lost, they had to pay substan-
74. AUDREY CHIN & MARK PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN
COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 41-44 (1985).
75. Brian J. Ostrom et al., What Are Tort Awards Really Like? The Untold Story from the State
Courts, 14 LAw & POL'Y 77, 80 (1992).
76. Id. at 84-86.
77. Id. at 82-84.
78. Id. at 83.
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tially higher awards.79 Median awards for individual plaintiffs success-
fully suing corporations were more than three times higher than the
awards in cases in which individuals sued each other.80 A regression
analysis indicated that the identity of the litigants was the most impor-
tant determinant of the size of the jury award. 81
A more extensive project analyzing civil jury trials across the coun-
try in 1992 also found that whether or not a litigant was a corporation
made a large difference. 82 The Civil Trial Court Network Project, or-
ganized by the National Center for State Courts, found that close to
half of the tort jury trials held in forty-five state courts in 1992 listed a
corporation as a defendant. 83 Another 11% included a hospital or a
medical company as a defendant, while 5% listed an insurance com-
pany as a defendant. 84 Ostrom and his colleagues compared cases in
which individuals sued other individuals versus those cases in which
individuals sued business corporations.85 Although in this study the
overall win rate for all tort cases was comparable, the win rate for
plaintiffs suing businesses in specific types of cases (including automo-
bile accident, medical malpractice, and premises liability) was higher
than the win rate for plaintiffs suing other individuals.8 6 In addition,
confirming the pattern in the 1989 data, individual plaintiffs suing
businesses received higher awards than individuals who sued other in-
dividuals, on average. 87
Both the Chin and Peterson report and the Ostrom and his col-
leagues' article acknowledge that the cases against individuals and
corporations in their samples might not be strictly comparable. Cor-
porations and individuals often engage in different types of behavior
or wrongdoing. The types of injuries, the number of claims, the legal
theories about defendant liability, and the settlement practices of the
attorneys might have contributed to the differential verdicts and
awards. A selection effect, in which attorneys settle or select cases for
judge versus jury trial somewhat differently when the defendant is an
individual versus a corporation, seems to be a particularly likely candi-
79. Id. at 84-85.
80. Id. at 85.
81. Ostrom et al., supra note 75, at 89.
82. Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79
JUDICATURE 233, 236-37 (1996).
83. Id. at 237.
84. Id. at 240.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 236.
87. Id. at 237.
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date for explaining the divergent results.88 For example, if corpora-
tions settle small cases at a rate higher than individuals, then that
would leave a greater proportion of high value cases with corporate
defendants in the mix. Vidmar warns about the dangers of relying on
jury verdict data to draw conclusions about the jury decision making
process:
Rather than jury biases, the verdict differences may result from the
fact that the juries are hearing very different evidence or responding
to different substantive law. We are comparing apples and
oranges. 89
Thus, cases that business corporations bring to trial may differ in some
significant ways from the cases that individuals bring to trial. Other
aspects of the system, including legal rules and settlement practices,
may favor-or disadvantage-repeat players such as business corpo-
rations, and it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions about even
the existence of differential treatment, let alone the reasons for it, on
the basis of verdict statistics alone.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES COMPARING REACTIONS TO CORPORATE
VERSUS INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
The difficulty of controlling for these extraneous factors makes it
imprudent to rely solely on jury verdict statistics for assessing how
juries react to corporate litigants. But what if we could control all of
the other factors that differentiate individual and corporate cases?
Adopting Vidmar's terminology, what if we could compare apples and
apples? 90
If jury differential treatment of the corporate litigant is real, as op-
posed to a spurious artifact of other differences between individual
and corporate lawsuits, then we should be able to detect differences in
jurors' reactions even when we hold constant other significant aspects
of a case. That is, corporations and individuals will be treated differ-
ently even if they engage in the same behaviors, cause identical harm,
and are governed by the same legal rules. Of course, any differential
treatment would not automatically be evidence of anti-business preju-
dice; one would also have to assess why jurors treat business distinc-
tively if they do.
88. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiri-
cism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1128-33 (1992).
89. N~eil Vidmar, Making Inferences about Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict Statistics: Cautions
about the Lorelei's Lied, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 599, 605 (1994).
90. See id.
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NEW RESULTS FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT
A recently completed study of Arizona jury reform provides some
relevant data about the degree to which judges and juries agree about
the outcomes of cases with business defendants. 91 In that study, which
examined the impact of jury discussions about the evidence during
trial, judges were asked to indicate their views of the degree to which
the evidence favored the defendant or the plaintiff on a seven-point
scale. They also rated their degree of surprise and satisfaction with
the jury's verdict. The researchers obtained information about the
jury verdict and other aspects of each case, including whether the
principal litigants for each side were individuals or businesses.
These data provide an ideal way to use actual jury decisions to test
assertions that the jury is anti-business. The judge's evaluation of the
merits of the case can serve as a control. If juries are governed by
unusual hostility to business defendants, then jury cases in which indi-
viduals sue business defendants should result in a higher proportion of
plaintiff wins and greater dissatisfaction and disagreement with the
verdict on the part of the trial judge, compared to cases in which indi-
viduals sue other individuals.
Statistical analyses of the Arizona data set, however, show no evi-
dence that juries in business cases reach verdicts that are dispropor-
tionately at odds with judicial views. The sample included eighty-six
cases in which individual plaintiffs sued individuals and forty-six cases
in which individuals sued businesses. Plaintiff win rates in the two
types of cases were roughly comparable (60% of the individual de-
fendant cases versus 63% of the business defendant cases). More sig-
nificantly, judicial ratings of surprise and satisfaction with the verdicts
in the two types of cases were no different. 92 Generally speaking,
judges were satisfied with jury outcomes and expressed little surprise
at jury decisions. Judicial evaluations were very similar in cases with
individual and business defendants. This was true even though cases
91. For further discussions of the methodology, see Paula L. Hannaford et al., Permitting Jury
Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the National Center for State Courts) and Valerie P. Hans et al., The Arizona Jury Reform
Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors, 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 1999).
92. T-tests comparing judges' ratings of surprise and satisfaction with the jury's decision show
no statistically significant differences between individual defendant and business defendant
cases. Surprise M's = 2.85 for Individual Defendant and 2.70 for Business Defendant cases; t
(123) = .45, ns; Satisfaction M's = 5.21 for Individual Defendant and 5.30 for Business Defendant
cases; t (122) = -.31, ns.
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with business defendants were longer and more complex than cases
with individual defendants. 93
There was no evidence that juries were more pro-plaintiff in cases
with business defendants. Table 1 presents the percentage and
number of cases in which individual plaintiffs sued individual or busi-
ness defendants, the jury verdicts in these cases, and the degree to
which the judge rated the evidence in these cases as favoring the
plaintiff, evenly balanced, or favoring the defense.94 To facilitate in-
terpretation, the table provides the percentage of plaintiff and defense
verdicts within each category of evidence strength. So, for example, in
cases in which the judge rated the evidence as favoring the defense, it
presents the percentage of those cases that resulted in plaintiff and
defense verdicts. The number of cases in the table is relatively small,
so it is important to be cautious in interpreting the results. Neverthe-
less, the results reveal more similarity than difference in individual
versus business defendant case outcomes.
TABLE 1
JUDGE-JURY AGREEMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE VERDICTS
IN INDIVIDUAL VERSUS BUSINESS DEFENDANT CASES
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT CASES
Plaintiff Verdict Defense Verdict Totals 95
Evidence favored plaintiff 88% (21) 13% (3) 100% (24)
Evidence evenly balanced 59% (16) 41% (11) 100% (27)
Evidence favored defense 40% (12) 60% (18) 100% (30)
BUSINESS DEFENDANT CASES
Plaintiff Verdict Defense Verdict Totals
Evidence favored plaintiff 81% (13) 19% (3) 100% (16)
Evidence evenly balanced 67% (10) 33% (5) 100% (15)
Evidence favored defense 31% (4) 69% (9) 100% (13)
93. The average length of the cases in which individuals sued other individuals was 13 hours,
compared to 22 hours for cases in which individuals sued businesses (t (54) = - 3.44, p = .001). A
composite Case Complexity Scale, which included judge and jury ratings of trial complexity and
the natural log of the trial's length, showed that business defendant cases were more complex (t
(124) = - 2.63, p = .01).
94. Judges responded on a seven-point scale, in which responses of 1, 2, or 3 indicated that the
evidence favored the plaintiff, a response of 4 indicated that the evidence was evenly balanced,
and responses of 5, 6, or 7 indicated that the evidence favored the defense.
95. The total number of cases represented in the analysis is slightly lower than the actual
number of individual and business defendant cases, because the Table 1 analysis included only
those cases that included information about the type of primary plaintiff and defendant, the
verdict, and the judicial rating.
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If jurors were markedly more pro-plaintiff in business defendant
cases, then one would expect the percentage of plaintiff verdicts
within each category of evidence to be higher in cases with business
defendants. However, that does not occur. The overall percentages
of plaintiff verdicts within each evidence category are generally com-
parable. When the judge rates the evidence as favorable to the plain-
tiff, juries reach plaintiff verdicts in 88% of the individual defendant
cases and 81% of the business defendant cases.
If juror anti-business sentiment was so strong as to lead to unjustifi-
able plaintiff verdicts, one would expect a greater number of plaintiff
verdicts when the evidence favored the defense in business defendant
cases compared to individual defendant cases. That does not happen
either; there are just four cases (31%) in which judges in business tri-
als rated the evidence as favoring the defense and the jury reached a
plaintiff verdict, and twelve instances (40%) in which the same oc-
curred in individual defendant cases. When the judge reports that evi-
dence is evenly balanced and presumably either verdict could be
justified, juries reach plaintiff verdicts in 59% of the individual de-
fendant cases and 67% of the business defendant cases. While the
number of cases in the analysis is not large, nevertheless, the overall
pattern of similarity between individual and business defendant cases
is striking. At least when we use the judge's evaluation of evidence as
a control, there is simply no support for the notion that juries are
more pro-plaintiff in business cases.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
Experimental studies done in research laboratories have taken a
different approach than the field study just described to compare reac-
tions to individual versus business corporation defendants. 96 A
number of mock jury experiments have explored the effect of varying
the identity of the defendant while controlling other factors. The in-
dependent studies show similar patterns and are worth summarizing
here.97 In an initial experiment, along with my colleague M. David
Ermann, I explored the potential for differential treatment by con-
ducting an experiment in which we varied the defendant's identity in a
personal injury lawsuit but kept everything else about the scenario the
96. See infra notes 97-124 and accompanying text.
97. See Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual
Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1989); MacCoun, supra note 60; Joseph Sanders et
al., Corporate Actor Responsibility in Three Societies (paper presented at the 1994 annual meet-
ing of the Law & Society Association, Phoeniz, AZ).
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same.98 Participants read a scenario in which some workers were
harmed by clearing debris from an empty lot, debris which was later
found to contain toxic waste. 99 Respondents then evaluated the negli-
gence of the key actors in the scenario and decided on an appropriate
award for the injured workers. 100 Half of the participants learned that
a "Mr. Jones" had hired the workers, while the other half read that the
"Jones Corporation" had done so. 10 1
The results provided some interesting evidence that when a corpo-
ration is a party in a case, it affects the way liability is assessed. Com-
pared to the subjects in the Mr. Jones condition, subjects in the Jones
Corporation condition were significantly more likely to hold the de-
fendant morally and legally responsible for the workers' injuries from
clearing the toxic waste. 102 Respondents saw the corporation as more
reckless, more likely to have known beforehand that the workers
might be harmed, and more blameworthy.10 3 Furthermore, compen-
satory awards to the workers injured by the actions of the Jones Cor-
poration were significantly higher than the awards to the workers
injured by Mr. Jones. 0 4 Multiple regression analyses found that judg-
ments of corporate culpability and recommendations of awards were
linked most strongly to perceptions of the Jones Corporation's reck-
lessness, not its perceived financial resources, suggesting that rather
than responding to deep versus empty pockets, respondents appeared
to be applying a different standard of recklessness to the corporation
and the individual.10 5 However, there were a number of limitations to
this study, including a college student sample, the brief scenarios, and
the fact that the subjects did not deliberate with others as real jurors
would. 10 6 Furthermore, the design of the Jones experiment did not
allow a test of competing explanations for the differential treatment of
the corporation.10 7
In two other experimental studies I conducted, I attempted to over-
come these limitations. In the first replication, I created a more realis-
tic mock jury simulation by using community residents, providing a
more detailed set of facts and legal instructions, conducting the exper-
98. Hans & Ermann, supra note 97, at 155.
99. Id. at 155-56.
100. Id. at 156-57.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 157-58.
103. Id.
104. Hans & Ermann, supra note 97, at 157, 161.
105. Id. at 159-61.
106. Id. at 162.
107. Id. at 163-64.
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iment at a courthouse, and,allowing people to deliberate to a group
verdict as actual juries would do. I used a slip-and-fall case where a
woman plaintiff was injured in a fall that occurred either in a furniture
store or at a tag sale in a private home. Thus, in one experimental
condition, the defendant was an individual, while in the other condi-
tion, all of the facts were the same but the defendant was a corpora-
tion. Participants in the study also completed questionnaires that
probed their attitudes toward civil litigation and business, and thus I
was able to examine whether these attitudes affected subjects' deci-
sions in the mock jury trial.
In the mock jury study, whether the defendant was an individual or
a corporation again significantly influenced judgments about the case.
Although there was substantial overlap in how the participants viewed
the individual and corporate defendant's actions, there were also dif-
ferences. In their initial, individual reactions to the case, those people
evaluating the slip and fall in the store were more likely to see the
defendant as negligent, compared to the people assessing the slip and
fall in the private home at a tag sale. Although the group verdicts
were no different, the percentage of fault that the juries attributed to
the parties diverged sharply (with the individual plaintiff given much
more of the blame when she fell in a home than in a store) and the
awards were very different as well (with higher awards to the plaintiff
who sued the corporation).
A second replication was included in a state telephone survey. I
designed a scenario experiment to find out why people might respond
differently to corporate parties in civil litigation. Poll participants first
gave their views on civil litigation, business, and other social attitudes.
Then, each respondent listened to a single scenario description, and
answered questions about their evaluations of the incident described
by the scenario. Different scenarios were constructed to test the
study's hypotheses. To examine the impact of corporate identity, the
defendant to a personal injury claim was described in different scena-
rios as an individual, a nonprofit corporation or association, or a for-
profit business corporation. Financial resources were varied to test
the "deep pockets" hypothesis. Statistical analyses of attitudes toward
business and civil litigation were conducted to determine whether and
how these attitudes influenced judgments of corporate litigants.
In this scenario experiment, the defendant's identity again had a
consistent effect on the poll participants' assessments of negligence
and recklessness. The individual defendant was held the least negli-
gent and reckless, the business corporation defendant was seen as the
most negligent and reckless, and responses to the nonprofit group fell
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in between. Thus, the greater degree of organization of the business,
and the use of the "corporation" label, led to higher levels of pre-
sumed negligence.
Interestingly, the "deep pockets" hypothesis was not supported in
the study. If jurors operate with a deep pockets approach, then we
should see higher awards when a defendant (whether an individual, a
nonprofit corporation, or a for profit corporation) is described as hav-
ing more financial resources. However, the study participants were
completely unaffected by information that the defendant had ample
or limited resources. Neither their negligence judgments nor their
awards were influenced by knowing about the financial resources of
the defendant.
To examine whether attitudes toward business affect liability judg-
ments, in both the mock jury simulation and the scenario experiment I
attempted to correlate the participants' views about business with
their decisions in the studies.' 0 8 In the scenario experiment, I tested
the prediction that attitudes toward business would be significantly
related to negligence and award decisions for the experimental condi-
tions that included business defendants. However, they were not. In-
stead, to my surprise, there were small, statistically significant
relationships between attitudes toward business and judgments of
negligence in the individual and nonprofit experimental conditions.
In the mock jury study, there was a statistically significant relationship
between attitudes toward business and judgments of negligence and
awards, but it occurred in both conditions of the experiment, when the
defendant was an individual and when the defendant was a corpora-
tion. As is typical in studies of the link between general attitudes and
specific decisions, the size of the statistically significant correlations
was typically modest, ranging from .17 to .40. In sum, if business atti-
tudes (at least my measures of general business attitudes) do affect
civil juror decision making, they do not appear to be particularly
strong determinants of those decisions, and they do not appear to be
limited to cases in which businesses are defendants.
I had somewhat more success in linking attitudes and case judg-
ments with another factor, the study participant's endorsement of the
view that corporations should be held to higher standards than indi-
viduals. In both the mock jury study and the scenario experiment,
judgments of negligence of the for-profit business corporations were
positively and significantly related to the respondent's agreement that
108. Valerie P. Hans, Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility (unpub-
lished manuscript, at ch. 6, on file with author).
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corporations should be held to a higher standard than individuals.
Once again, however, the correlations between attitudes and judg-
ments were rather modest, ranging from .21 to .30. However, unlike
the findings with general attitudes toward business, this effect oc-
curred only in the business defendant conditions.
Another research project, this one conducted by V. Lee Hamilton
and Joseph Sanders and their colleagues as part of public opinion
surveys in the United States and Japan, found some evidence that peo-
ple in both the United States and Japan regard corporate wrongdoing
distinctively.'0 9 In the surveys, they asked survey participants their
opinions about specific acts of injury and wrongdoing in corporate set-
tings.110 One of the stories was based on the Hans and Ermann
worker injury scenario, in which workers hired by either an individual
or a corporation were injured while working in an area that had toxic
waste."' Some versions of the scenario described the actor as stop-
ping the work when alerted of the potential harm (a relatively low
level of negligence), while other scenarios presented the actor as more
reckless by instructing the workers to continue working near the po-
tentially toxic waste. 112
Analyzing the Japanese and American data, the researchers found
that participants in both countries distinguished between individual
and corporate actors mostly when the situation involved low levels of
recklessness. 113 When there was a high degree of recklessness, both
the individual and the corporate actor were treated similarly and held
to high levels of responsibility." 4 But when the level of negligence
was less extreme, respondents believed that the corporation should
have been better able than the individual to anticipate and avoid the
injury to the workers. 115
Other researchers looking at the question of a corporate identity
effect have found similar results. MacCoun asked California jurors
who were waiting to serve on a trial to give their reactions to six per-
sonal injury lawsuits. 116 The jurors read brief descriptions of the
109. Sanders et al., supra note 97. For a fuller description of the study methodology, see V.
Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Corporate Crime Through Citizens' Eyes: Stratification and
Responsibility in the United States, Russia, and Japan, 30 L. & Soc'y REv. 513, 526-31 (1996).
110. Sanders et al., supra note 97, at 7-9.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 7-9.
113. Id. at 11 & figs.1, 2, 3, & 4.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. MacCoun, supra note 60, at 127-28.
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cases, which varied the identity of the defendant. 117 Depending on
the experimental condition, the defendant was described as a poor in-
dividual, rich individual, or a corporation. 118 Most of the cases cen-
tered around injuries in a business setting. 119 In one slip-and-fall case,
some jurors read about Mr. Brock, the "poor" defendant, who was
described as the operator and owner of "Chowdown Palace," a small
take-out fast food stand (representing a Mom-and-Pop type of busi-
ness), and an injury that occurred in his business.' 20 Other jurors read
about the same injury, but this time the defendant was a "rich" Mr.
Brock, again the operator and owner of Chowdown Palace, which was
now one of a chain of take-out food stands.12' A third set of jurors
read about the same injury but with the defendant described as a cor-
poration, Chowdown Food Enterprises, which owned the Chowdown
Palace, a chain of take-out fast food restaurants. 22 The results of the
MacCoun study were interesting: There were no overall differences in
the liability judgments of jurors who read the poor versus rich individ-
ual defendant scenarios, but the liability decisions of jurors who de-
cided the individual scenario cases versus the corporate scenario case
were different. 23 The corporation was more likely to be seen as liable
than either the rich or the poor individual.' 24
Vidmar's study of medical malpractice juries also did not provide
support for a deep pockets approach. 125 He tested the deep pockets
explanation of jury awards in medical malpractice cases.126 In one
part of the project, participants were presented with the case of a
woman who had broken a leg and suffered complications, and were
asked to recommend a figure for pain and suffering. 27 The injury was
described to some participants as being due to the negligence of
health care providers and to others as the result of a car accident. 28
Furthermore, the negligence was attributed to one person, two peo-
ple, or a hospital/corporation. 129 If people take a deep pockets ap-
proach, then the award should have been higher in the medical
117. Id. at 128.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 146-47, 127-34.
121. Id.
122. MacCoun, supra note 60, at 146-47, 134-39.
123. Id. at 136-38.
124. Id. at 137-38.
125. VIDMAR, supra note 62, at 212, 219.
126. Id. at 204-06, 212-15.
127. Id. at 205.
128. Id. at 205-06.
129. Id.
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malpractice conditions and when the hospital and corporate defend-
ants were to blame.' 30 However, consistent with my research, the
awards were not significantly different across these conditions.' 3'
A final study aimed at examining punitive damages varied the net
worth of the defendant in a complex products liability case.' 32 The net
worth figures were $11 million for the low net worth company and
$611 million for the high net worth company. 133 However, the varia-
tion in net worth did not make a difference in liability judgments or in
compensatory damage awards.' 34 Surprisingly, the difference in net
worth did not significantly influence punitive damage judgments
either, even though it would be expected to increase for the wealthier
company.' 35
In sum, the experimental research that I and other scholars have
conducted shows that corporations are treated differently in at least
some instances. Because of the limited range of cases studied, the
generality of the phenomenon is not yet known. However, some of
the reasons are becoming clearer. For-profit organizations are held to
the highest standards; attitudes toward business play if anything a mi-
nor role in differential treatment; and there is little evidence that ju-
rors take a deep pockets approach in deciding liability or reaching
awards. The comparability of the treatment of individual and business
defendant cases in the Arizona study, controlling for judicial evalua-
tions of the strength of the evidence, hints that if there is differential
treatment in actual cases it is a phenomenon likely to be shared by
judges and jurors alike.
JUROR INTERVIEWS
The jury verdict statistics and experiments point in the same direc-
tion-toward differential treatment of business corporations. To pro-
vide further insight, I interviewed 269 civil jurors in cases with
business and corporate parties.136 One of my major goals was to find
out how jurors reacted to the task of determining the negligence of a
business corporation. I asked jurors during the interview a set of
questions about the impact of the corporation in the case they de-
130. Id. at 206-08, 212.
131. VIDMAR, supra note 62, at 206-08 (describing the deep pocket studies).
132. Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of
Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 297, 310-28 n.59.
133. Id. at 312.
134. Id. at 317 tbl.3 (Liability Judgments) & 319-20 tbl.4 (Compensatory Awards).
135. Id. at 324 tbl.6.
136. For a brief description of these studies, see Hans, supra note 63 and Hans & Lofquist,
supra note 43. A fuller description is provided in Hans, supra note 108.
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cided. First, I asked them how they were influenced by the fact that
one of the parties in the case was a corporation; a follow-up question
inquired whether they would have thought about the case any differ-
ently if all of the other circumstances were the same but the defendant
had been an individual rather than a corporation. Finally, I asked
them whether they thought it was appropriate to hold a corporation to
a different standard than an individual person. Their replies, and the
reasons they gave for them, proved to be quite interesting. Only a
minority of jurors said that the corporate identity of the party affected
their decision making. Similarly, when jurors were asked about
whether they would have decided the case differently if there had
been no corporation-if it had been a dispute between individuals,
just 23% said that if the case had been between individuals, it would
have changed their approach.
Regarding the deep pockets approach, the majority of jurors I inter-
viewed said that the financial wealth of the parties did not affect them.
A number of jurors, however, said that their juries discussed either the
defendant's or the plaintiff's insurance coverage at some point during
the deliberation. Jurors often wondered whether or not insurance
companies had already paid for the medical and other costs of injury.
One point should be mentioned: It is quite difficult after the fact to
assess the factors influencing one's own decision making. This is even
more challenging in the jury context when judges often admonish ju-
rors to treat corporations the same as individual parties. Thus, it is
important to look at where results of studies using different methodol-
ogies converge. However, whatever reliance we might place on juror
statements that they are or are not affected by corporate identity, the
reasons they give for treating corporations the same or differently are
worth cataloguing.
REASONS FOR SIMILAR TREATMENT
In arguing in favor of equivalent treatment for individuals versus
corporations, some jurors I interviewed emphasized the fairness issue:
"It didn't really affect me. I try to be fair with people."'137 Others said
they simply focused on the testimony in the case and gave little
thought to the fact that a corporation was a party in the litigation: "I
really wasn't thinking on the fact that it being a company. Mostly
what I was personally thinking was the fact of which one was negligent
in the case.... I don't remember us even talking about it."'138 Several
137. Hans & Lofquist, supra note 43, at 100.
138. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 10, Case 18.
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other jurors observed that the corporation was really just a collection
of individuals, and in some cases with small businesses, only one indi-
vidual. Therefore, it was inappropriate to treat the business party in a
different way: "No, basically I saw the business as being [the individ-
ual who was the owner] .... It wasn't really a corporation that we
were dealing with, it was really one man's kind of operation .... He
still bore the responsibility of the work that was done.' 39
Other jurors observed that when the corporation takes on particular
roles, it has the duty to carry out those roles responsibly, but this
would be just the same if an individual adopted the same roles:
If the company's going to be the owner or a house or the individual,
they both should have responsibility of keeping it up, keeping it up
to standards. It doesn't matter... they should live up to the respon-
sibilities whether they are an individual or a company. 140
REASONS FOR DIFFERENT TREATMENT
Jurors used a range of justifications for treating corporations differ-
ently. Not surprisingly, virtually no jurors stated that their own biases
against business led them to treat a business corporation differently.
Instead, they offered rationales that included the corporation's status,
role, organizational resources, size, and potential impact. Jurors as-
serted that the corporation had greater organizational assets than typi-
cal individuals, which in turn increased their potential to anticipate the
potentially negative impact of their products and workplace
conditions.
For any given situation, you take something like this, you take the
environment, you take anything, it's a lot easier for a corporation to
give the information that they need to make an intelligent decision
than it is for an individual. They also have the resources of capital
to make an informed decision. I think they should be held to a set of
higher standards.141
Other jurors mentioned the specific roles and responsibilities that
business corporations have with respect to their customers, their em-
ployees, and the public at large. A desire to hold those with expertise
to a greater degree of accountability was particularly evident in the
medical malpractice cases: "I think doctors should be held to a higher
standard ... because they hold themselves out to be an expert in that
field."'1 42 Similarly, a juror who agreed that the medical profession
139. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 3, Case 8.
140. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 8, Case 10.
141. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 2, Case 28.
142. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 8, Case 33.
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had to adhere to a higher standard than individuals observed: "Well,
yes in a sense that that is their business. You know, for their line of
work. But, if you're an engineer and the bridge falls down, you have a
responsibility there too." 143
Also important was the impact or potential impact of a corpora-
tion's activity: "Of course they've got to exercise a great deal more
safety awareness, they've got many more people in there to worry
about. ' 144 In an identical vein: "Corporations are looking out for
thousands of people; an individual doesn't look out for that many peo-
ple .... The effect of the corporation's actions affects more than an
individual would other people in society. ' 145 There are a number of
reasons, then, that jurors might treat the business corporation differ-
ently quite apart from the anti-business tendencies they are reported
to have.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the charges relating to the civil jury's hostility to
business and corporate parties in civil lawsuits, and having surveyed
recent research on how juries treat business and corporate parties in
civil litigation, it is time to take stock. Contrasting illusions and reali-
ties: Is the jury guilty as charged?
The jury verdict analyses and the experiments both point in the
same direction, that juries respond differently in at least some cases to
business and corporate defendants. In certain instances, a corporate
defendant might be held liable when an individual defendant might
not. Or, a corporate defendant might have to pay a larger award than
an individual defendant might be expected to pay. But looking more
closely for reasons for this differential treatment, juror hostility to
business is not a particularly strong candidate. Instead, in assessing
corporate liability, civil jurors appear to adopt a distinctive standard
of responsibility, taking into account features of the corporation such
as its role, its duties to consumers and employees, its collective exper-
tise, and the potential impact of its actions. The Arizona study failed
to find any evidence that juries disproportionately reward plaintiffs
who sue business defendants. Using judges' ratings of the strength of
evidence as a control, we found that the rate of plaintiff verdicts was
about the same for individual and business defendants. Finally, in
contrast to the rhetoric about juries in business cases, several studies
143. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 3, Case 23.
144. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 1, Case 32.
145. Confidential Research Interview with Juror 5, Case 26.
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question the conventional wisdom that the financial resources of the
corporate defendant encourage a deep pockets approach.
Of course, it may be cold comfort to corporate counsel that
although a raging anti-business jury is more likely to appear in works
of fiction 146 than in the-courtroom, their clients will be evaluated by
citizens who expect businesses to uphold high standards of behavior.
Nevertheless, the empirical realities presented in this Article add a
new dimension to the policy debate over the civil jury's political role.
They inform us what would be lost if sometime in the future illusions
prevailed over realities and the civil jury no longer played a significant
part in the resolution of business and corporate disputes.
146. See, for example, the best-seller by JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY (1996).
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